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Abstract— In light of the fast propagation of recent Internet
worms, human intervention in securing the Internet during
worm outbreaks is of little significance. In order to reduce the
damage worms may cause, existing Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) need to be adaptive to the security-related requirements
of their monitoring networks. This paper presents a Multi-
level security based Autonomic Parameter Selector (MAPS) that
can be implemented over any existing IDSs. The deployment
architecture consists of a number of hierarchically placed local
security managers, metropolitan security managers, and a global
security manager. These security managers report events to a
Worm Advisory System (WAS). WAS accordingly sets the threat
level of the network. Based on this level, MAPS selects the most
optimum parameters for the entire IDS to combat against the
propagating worm. The MAPS architecture maintains the system
performance by constantly evaluating three metrics, namely False
Negative Avoidance, False Positive Avoidance, and Performance
Overhead. Extensive experiments, using real network traffic and
a recently proposed worm detection system, demonstrate that
MAPS is capable of advising an IDS with optimum parameter
values to effectively and promptly hinder further propagation of
worms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Together with the emergence of high speed networks, recent
times have seen the spread of some malicious Internet worms
propagating with overwhelmingly high propagation rates [1]–
[3]. Studies suggest that it is possible for even faster types of
worms, such as Warhol worms and Flash worms to appear in
the Internet [4]. If such worms do appear, the whole population
of Internet users can be infected within a minute. Because
human intervention requires considerably long time to carry
out necessary defensive steps, relying on experts to monitor
networks during worm outbreaks has little significance. In-
deed, by the time experts come up with a defense solution,
significant damage may have already been caused. In order to
effectively and promptly defend against worms, it is necessary
to automatically monitor the security of networks.
Recent literatures present several worm detection systems
based on various techniques such as traffic analysis [5], taint
analysis [6], data mining [7], honeypots [8], and content-
based analysis [9]. The authors propose a signature-based
hierarchical worm detection technique for large scale net-
works in [10] and a multiple-substrings signature generation
approach in [11]. These systems deploy several parameters
in order to enforce suitable security policies. While these
research works aim to make their respective proposed systems
practical, one missing point consists in requiring managers
to automatically and dynamically adjust their performance
parameters according to the requirements of their monitored
networks.
In this paper, we present MAPS - a Multi-level Security
based Automatic Parameter Selector, which supplies the im-
plemented network IDS with suitable values for its parameters.
MAPS takes account of the current Threat Level of the net-
work. The threat level reflects the current worm activity in the
network and is decided by a Worm Advisory System (WAS).
It is expressed in terms of levels from one to five (thus, multi-
level). Based on the current threat level, MAPS dynamically
adjusts the security policy taking into account three metrics -
false negative avoidance, false positive avoidance, and perfor-
mance overhead. In case the IDS has to generate the worm
signature, a fourth metric - signature generation time is also
considered. These metrics are determined by the values of the
adjustable parameters used by the corresponding IDS. MAPS
selects the optimum values of these parameters that best satisfy
the performance requirements under the corresponding threat
level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses our prior work and highlights the performance
metrics that determine the performance of an IDS. A detailed
description of the major procedures of MAPS is provided
in Section III. The performance evaluation of the system is
presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM PERFORMANCE METRICS
The authors proposed a signature-based worm detection
system over large scale networks in [10]. The system consists
of hierarchically placed local security managers, metropolitan
security managers, and a global security manager, as shown
in Fig. 1. The local managers collect suspicious or worm-
like flows and hand them to their corresponding metropolitan
managers. The suspicious flow collection is based on the fact
that worms carry similar strings in their payloads. Sample
strings are extracted from each incoming network flow and
their occurrence frequencies in the traffic are counted. The
incoming flows that contain sample strings of high occur-
rence frequencies are flagged suspicious and are sent to the
respective metropolitan managers for further analysis. The
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Fig. 1. The envisioned hierarchical worm detection architecture.
metropolitan managers then use clustering technique to sort
only worm flows from the suspicious flow pool. The sorted
worms are used to generate the signature for the propagating
worm. The generated signature consists of multiple substrings
that commonly exist in worm flows but not in normal flows
[11].
The worm detection scheme uses several parameters. During
the suspicious flow collection, it has to fix appropriate values
to the length of each sample string (LS), number of sample
strings to be extracted from each flow (NS), and the repetitive
occurrence threshold (∆TH ). Similarly, during the signature
generation, it requires setting the minimum length of signature
substrings (LMIN ), number of worms flows to be used to
extract signature substrings (NW ), and the number of normal
flows to check the presence of normal strings in the signature
(NN ). These parameters are empirical in deciding the total sig-
nature generation time (TSIG). Experimental results obtained
from heuristic approaches suggest that the proposed scheme
can achieve high accuracy in real world networks. However,
owing to the continuously changing network state, different
values of the parameters are suitable for different conditions.
The primary challenge in extending the system online is to fix
these values automatically.
Various metrics can be used to evaluate the performance
of an IDS. In [12], Fink et al. point out some of these
metrics, such as accuracy, detection rate, flexibility, overhead,
error reporting, router interaction, timeliness, etc. Considering
a worm detection scenario, False Negative Avoidance, False
Positive Avoidance rate, and Performance Overhead rate need
primary follow-ups. Apart from these three metrics, we also
choose the Signature Generation Time as another performance
metric when the signature generation process is involved. We
next discuss these metrics and explain how they should be
adjusted for an autonomic security management of networks.
A. False Negative Avoidance (FNA)
The FNA indicates the detection rate of the IDS. For each
threat level L (1 ≤ L ≤ 5), critical FNA rate (minimum
detection rate) ηL (0 < η1 < ... < η5 < 1) is pre-defined by
the administrator. A high FNA is required when there is an
active propagation of Internet worms. During such adversaries,
the IDS system may have to sacrifice other two metrics to
some extent.
B. False Positive Avoidance (FPA)
FPA indicates how fairly the IDS system allows normal
traffic to pass undisturbed. FPA is expressed in terms of false
positive rate (FPR) as, FPA = 1−FPR. As there is a tradeoff
between FPA and FNA, FPA rate may need relaxation if FNA
rate is increased. The desired minimum FPA rate of the system
at each threat level is also defined by the administrator as
σL (1 > σ1 > ... > σ5 > 0).
C. Performance Overhead (PO)
Cost is another prominent factor in determining the perfor-
mance of an IDS. It is thus necessary to design the IDS in such
a way that maximum security and accuracy can be achieved
with a nominal overhead. We define PO rate as the percentage
of available buffer size required for analysis. Similarly to FNA
and FPA, the critical PO rate (maximum affordable PO rate) of
an IDS at each threat level (L) is defined by the administrator
as θL (0 < θ1 < ... < θ5 < 1).
There is a trade-off between FNA, FPA, and PO rates. It is
always preferable to achieve high FNA and FPA at the cost a
low PO. However, during emergency situations such as worm
outbreaks, it is necessary to sacrifice some FPA and PO in
favor of FNA. In contrast, during normal network states, FNA
rate is slightly reduced in order to achieve higher FPA and
lower PO rates.
D. Signature Generation Time
Signature generation time (TSIG) is a vital performance
metric for signature-based IDSs. During high threat levels,
IDSs can afford relatively short time for signature generation.
The value of TSIG for email worms such as Beagle, NetSky,
and MyDoom can be fairly long (a few minutes). However, for
fast spreading scanning worms such as Code Red, Blaster, and
Slammer, signatures are required within a limited span of time.
Signatures for scanning worms should be generated within 60
seconds in order to effectively control their propagation [4].
This indicates that an IDS system has to automatically generate
signature within a significantly limited time after the worm
has been detected. Indeed, we first ensure that the signature is
generated within the defined TSIG. FNA, FPA, and PO rates
are then considered.
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Fig. 2. A typical deployment of the proposed system.
III. A MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY BASED AUTONOMIC
PARAMETER SELECTION SCHEME
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the
proposed scheme. A typical deployment of MAPS is illustrated
in Fig. 2. The IDS implemented at the gate of the network
updates security events to a Worm Advisory System (WAS).
WAS accordingly defines the threat level of the network.
The MAPS-monitor uses the defined threat level to find
suitable parameters to advise the IDS. Note that MAPS does
not propose a new worm detection scheme but advises the
implemented IDS with optimum values of its parameters in
order to efficiently defend against the spreading worm. The
operations of WAS and MAPS are further explained below.
A. Worm Advisory System (WAS)
WAS defines the threat level of the network based on
the events reported by the IDS or other entities, such as,
firewalls, IDSs of other collaborating networks, and high-
hierarchy components. It analyzes the events in timeslots.
Threat level one corresponds to a normal network state when
no malicious activities are reported. In contrary, threat level
five implies that the system is either under attack or is in a
grave danger of a worm propagation. The threat level of a
given timeslot is decided by considering
1) the total number of events observed in the timeslot with
respect to a pre-defined Event Threshold, and
2) the increasing or decreasing tendency of the number of
events with respect to previous timeslots.
Given the fact that the WAS uses a simple statistical data of
events to define the threat level, it can be directly handled also
by the network administrator, if desired.
B. MAPS Monitor
It is a common trend to investigate the performance of an
IDS with test data before implementing it online. The MAPS
monitor is provided with the results obtained when the IDS
system is initially evaluated with such test data. Let Q be the
set of these results. Q stores each scenario k as a quadruple
Tk = {Pk, ηk, σk, θk}, where Pk is the set of parameter values
used and ηk, σk, and θk are the corresponding values of the
three metrics in the test scenario k.
Fig. 3 depicts the flow chart of the MAPS algorithm. The
current threat level of the network is sent to MAPS by WAS.
The critical rates of FNA, FPA, and PO, denoted by ηc, σc,
and θc, respectively, are initialized to the critical values of the
corresponding threat level, ηL, σL, and θL, respectively. The
proposed algorithm takes a greedy approach in maximizing the
Fig. 3. MAPS algorithm.
FNA and FPA rates and minimizing the PO rate. Hence, the
transitory critical values of these three metrics, are initialized
as η = 1, σ = 1, and θ = 0.
The optimum quadruple search is carried out in the order of
PO, FPA, and FNA. At first, MAPS searches for quadruples
in Q whose corresponding PO rates are within the transitory
critical PO rate (θ). Thus, the set of quadruples (Q1), which
fulfill the PO requirement, can be expressed as
Q1 = {Tk : Tk ∈ Q; θk ≤ θ} (1)
Q1 contains only the quadruples whose parameter can perform
within the overhead θ. Q1 = φ implies that the IDS cannot
function within the given transitory PO rate (θ). Thus, the
MAPS monitor increases θ by ∆θ. If θ is within the critical PO
rate (θc), it carries out another search from Q. Otherwise, θc
is incremented to (θc+∆θc) and the whole search is repeated,
but with a higher θc.
From the quadruples in Q1, MAPS then searches for the
quadruples whose accuracy is more than the transitory critical
FPA rate (σ). Hence, the set of the selected quadruples (Q2),
which fulfill the PO and FPA requirements, is expressed as
Q2 = {Tk : Tk ∈ Q1;σk ≥ σ} (2)
In case Q2 = φ, the MAPS monitor decreases σ by a fixed
value. If this decrease does not affect the relation (σ > σc),
MAPS searches for appropriate quadruples from Q1 again.
Otherwise, σc is relaxed and θc is increased. The whole search
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is repeated with a lower σc and a higher θc. This process is
repeated until (Q2 = φ). Similar adjustment is carried out for
FNA. MAPS searches for quadruples in Q2 that satisfy the
FNA transitory critical rate (η). The set of the quadruples that
are now chosen (Q3) is expressed as,
Q3 = {Tk : Tk ∈ Q2; ηk ≥ η} (3)
Similarly to the PO and FPA checks, MAPS confirms whether
transitory critical FNA rate is satisfied. If Q3 = φ, MAPS
relaxes η to η−∆η. If the new transitory critical FNA rate is
more than ηc, it carries out next search from Q2. Otherwise,
ηc and σc are further reduced while θc is increased to start
the search from the beginning. This is repeated until Q3 = φ.
MAPS uses Q3 to select the quadruple that is optimum for
the current network state.
As Q3 may contain multiple quadruples, a separate param-
eter needs to be defined to select the best quadruple from Q3.
We define partial gains of FNA, FPA, and PO for the quadruple
Tk, denoted by Eηk, Eσk, and Eθk, respectively, as
Eηk = ηk − ηL; Eσk = σk − σL; Eθk = θL − θk (4)
where ηL, σL, and θL are the critical FNA, FPA, and PO
rates, respectively, for the corresponding threat level L. Using
the partial gains of the three metrics, the total gain of Tk is
calculated as
Ek = Eηk + Eσk + Eθk. (5)
From Q3, the quadruple with the maximum value of E is
selected. The parameter values of the selected quadruple are
sent to the IDS for deployment.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Set-up
The experiment is carried out using the results obtained
during the evaluation of the worm-detection IDS proposed in
[10]. During the suspicious flow collection process, the IDS
extracts NS sample strings of length LS from each incoming
network flow and counts the occurrence frequency of each
sample string. It then uses a Repetitive Occurrence Threshold
(∆TH ) to decide if a worm is propagating. The FNA and FPA
rates for different NS , LS , and ∆TH are obtained using a
real network data that contains traces of Beagle worms. The
system is assumed to set aside a maximum of 1,000 Bytes of
buffer storage per each flow. The PO rate per flow is, thus,
defined as
θ =
LS ×NS
1000
(6)
During high threat levels, the IDS needs to achieve a high
FNA rate, even at the cost of some FPA and PO rates. Hence,
we set the critical values of FNA, FPA, and PO rates for
the five threat levels to {0.70, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95}, {0.95,
0.90, 0.85, 0.80, 0.70}, and {0.20, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 1.00}.
In the first experiment, we use the above-mentioned set-up to
investigate change in threat level of the network when events
are reported. We then investigate the IDS performance under
these threat levels. In the second experiment, we consider a
signature generation scenario. We assume that a threat level
has been fixed by the WAS. The signature generation time
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(b) Timeslot = 60 sec, event threshold = 10
Fig. 4. Adjustments to the threat level with respect to the number of events
reported.
(TSIG) at threat levels one to five are set to 105, 90, 75, 60, and
45 seconds respectively. MAPS finds the best set of parameters
that can generate signature within the TSIG of the current
threat level. These parameters include the number of worm
flows to be used for signature generation (NW ), minimum
length of signature substrings to be extracted (LMIN ), and
the number of normal flows required to check the inclusion of
normal substrings in the signature (NN ). The corresponding
FNA, FPA, and PO rates are then used to evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme. We obtain the FNA and
FPA rates directly from preliminary experiments which are
presented in [10]. PO rate is defined as the percentage of the
worm payload that is necessary to generate the signature under
the selected scenario.
B. Experimental Results
Fig. 4 depicts the change in the threat level when events are
reported. As illustrated in the figure, threat level is increased
when a large number of events are reported and when the
number of reported events shows an increasing tendency in
each timeslot. The stability of threat level primarily depends
upon the length of each timeslot and the value of event
threshold. If the timeslot length is short, the WAS can quickly
respond to the reported events. However, this also degrades the
stability of the threat level management because threat level
is subject to changes within a short span of time. Considering
the fact that a new set of parameters has to be deployed by the
IDS during each threat level change, frequent changes in threat
level make the IDS unstable. This phenomenon is illustrated
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Fig. 5. FNA, FPA, and PO rates for different threat levels.
in Fig. 4(a), where each timeslot is of length 10 seconds and
event threshold is set to 5. Instability of threat level can be
overcome by increasing the timeslot length. As more events
are reported in longer timeslots, it is also necessary to increase
the event threshold. In Fig. 4(b), the length of each timeslot is
increased to 60 seconds, and the event threshold is extended to
10. Consequently, a relatively stable setting of threat level is
obtained. Setting the timeslot length to 60 seconds is effective
to detect email worm propagations. This is because sufficient
time will be guaranteed for users to collect their emails from
mail servers. However, for a fast propagating worm such as
Slammer [1], a shorter value is preferred.
Using the aforementioned threat level adjustment scenario,
we now investigate the system performance during a real worm
propagation. Fig. 5 depicts the FNA, FPA, and PO rates for
various threat levels. In a normal network state where the
system has to ensure minimal false positives and incur low
cost, the FNA ratio is low. With an increase in the threat level,
the FNA rate increases. Because there is a trade-off between
the three performance metrics, an increase in FNA is obtained
at the price of increase in the overhead. However, the proposed
scheme maintains the value of the sacrificed metric within the
corresponding critical rate.
Having presented the performance of WAS and MAPS in
a detection scenario, we move to the next experiment. This
experiment considers a signature generation case. Table I de-
picts the performance of the optimum signature generated for
different threat levels. The signature generation time (TSIG)
is the primary metric that is first ensured. During a high
threat level, the IDS needs to generate signature within a
limited time. In such adversary, the IDS should tolerate a
slight relaxation in FNA and FPA rates. As indicated in Table
I, the FNA rate is slightly affected as TSIG takes smaller
values with an increasing threat level. Similarly, the total PO
rate also becomes larger as the threat level increases. During
the considered signature generation process, common strings
from worms are first extracted. From these common strings,
normal strings are gradually deleted from the list. Thus, a
refined signature, which is the set of remaining strings, is
generated. When TSIG holds a low value, the normal token
exclusion process cannot complete. This results in higher PO
rate. However, figures in Table I indicate that the proposed
scheme is capable of selecting parameters that best fit the
prevailing network condition.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF THE WORM SIGNATURE GENERATED DURING
DIFFERENT THREAT LEVELS.
Threat level TG (sec) FNA rate FPA rate PO rate
1 105 1.000 1.000 0.013
2 90 1.000 1.000 0.013
3 75 0.998 1.000 0.018
4 60 0.970 1.000 0.048
5 45 0.970 1.000 0.048
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed an architecture for selecting the
most optimum parameters to enable an IDS system maximum
detection accuracy while maintaining minimal cost. In the
proposed scheme, a worm advisory system first defines the
threat level of the network. Taking into account the threat
level, the proposed scheme selects the most optimum values
of system parameters to best deal with the impending worm
outbreaks. A high priority is given to avoid false negatives
and false positives. At the same time, an overhead check is
also performed before parameters are sent to the IDS for a
real implementation. Through experiments, we showed that the
proposed scheme is effective in reducing the cost of security
monitoring, and can be of great help to administrators during
worm outbreaks.
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